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CATASTROPHIC FINANCIAL FAILURES:
ENRON AND MORE
Geoffrey P. Millert
Over the past few years, a number of firms have suffered cata-
strophic financial collapse, which resulted in harm to investors and
significant spillover effects in the economy. Enron and WorldCom
are only the largest and most recent of these disasters.1 The 1989 col-
lapse of Lincoln Savings & Loan (Lincoln Savings) was an equally sig-
nificant event. The failure of Lincoln Savings eventually cost the U.S.
government $3.4 billion and precipitated a political scandal involving
five U.S. Senators, including former astronaut John Glenn and 2000
presidential candidate John McCain.
Many non-U.S. corporations also have suffered catastrophic fi-
nancial collapse. The recent debacle with the HIH Insurance Group
(HIH) provides the most salient example of a catastrophic financial
failure in Australia. HIH was placed in provisional liquidation in
March 2001, with debts of up to AUD$5.3 billion. 2 The HIH bank-
ruptcy, which was the largest in Australia's history, resulted in large
losses for investors,3 a government bailout for policyholders, 4 and
spikes in premiums for governmental and professional liability poli-
cies,5 not to mention significant disruption in the building industry
because of difficulties builders faced in obtaining compulsory home
warranty insurance. 6 In addition, in the wake of the HIH fiasco, the
insurance industry threatened "to withdraw from public liability and
professional indemnity cover" unless the government implemented
tort and tax reforms. 7
t Stuyvesant P. and William T. III Comfort Professor of Law, New York University
Law School. A.B., Princeton University, 1973; J.D., Columbia University, 1978.
1 See Thor Valdmanis & Andrew Backover, WorldCom in 'Death Spiral,' USA TODAY,
June 27, 2002, at lB.
2 Adler To Resume Giving Evidence at HIH Royal Commission, AAP NEws, June 12, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 21145019.
3 See Sue Lecky, Auditors Are Called to Account, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 21,
2001, at (Business) 45.
4 Fed-Govt Maintains $640m Enough for Scheme, AAP NEWS, May 8, 2002, available at
2002 WL 18031466.
5 See The Enron Down Under, ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 74.
6 See Lachlan Colquhoun, Former Goldman Boss a Witness in HIH Collapse Probe, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, May 20, 2002, at 4; Sharon Labi & Royal Abbott, Fed-Building Insurer
Sparks Housing Industry Crisis, AAP NEws, Apr. 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 18028375.
7 See Allesandra Fabro & Morgan Mellish, Insurers Threaten To Pull Cover, AUSTL. FIN.
REv., July 9, 2002, at 1.
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In Japan, EIEI International (EIEI), a high-flying conglomerate, con-
trolled some of the most prestigious and prominent real estate
properties in the world during the Japanese bubble economy of 1988
to 1990.8 EIEI failed in 1990, although it was propped up for several
years by its main bank, the Long Term Credit Bank ofJapan, until the
bank itself went under, in large part because of billions of dollars in
losses on loans to EIEI.
One of the most notorious failures of all time was that of Luxem-
bourg-based Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI).
Despite billing itself as an innovative and public-spirited institution
that served the needs of developing economies, BCCI was, in fact, an
elaborate financial fraud, whose profits BCCI officials allegedly dis-
guised "by moving millions of dollars in cash through a labyrinth of
BCCI accounts." 9 When BCCI collapsed in July 1991, it was hopelessly
insolvent, and thousands of small depositors were bereft of their life
savings.
The damages caused by these and other fiascos are irreversible.
One can only try to understand how the catastrophes happened in the
hope of avoiding them in the future. This Article looks across these
six cases-WorldCom, Enron, Lincoln Savings, HIH, EIEI, and
BCCI-and attempts to identify common threads that might help pre-
vent similar disasters in the future. Each of these six events was a com-
plex phenomenon with its own etiology, development, and resolution.
Discussing any one of them in detail, much less comparing all six, is
beyond the scope of this Article, which hopes only to touch upon
some of the apparent common features that, upon further inquiry,
might yield fruitful research and investigation. 10
The six cases at issue share a number of features. The commonal-
ities are surprising, even remarkable. Each of the features this Article
addresses-massive growth spurts, key corporate officers with strong
political connections, and domination of the firm by a single individ-
ual or small group-is potentially innocuous; indeed, many perfectly
safe and well-managed firms display one or more of these features.
8 For a discussion of the Japanese bubble economy and its collapse, see THOMAS F.
CARGILL ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY 91-116 (1997).
9 Michael Isikoff, U.S. Links Bank to Drug Carte WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1988, at Al.
10 Two caveats are in order. First, regarding HIH in particular, this matter is currently
under investigation by the Royal Commission. Witnesses who have appeared before the
Commission disagree as to what transpired. Accordingly, it is not possible at this stage to
make definitive judgments or to assign blame for the fiasco. However, some of the facts
about HIH appear to be reasonably well established or undisputed. This Article intends to
enlist these facts, without venturing too far into a difficult and ongoing controversy.
Second, I have had personal involvement in two of these matters-BCCI and EIEI-as
an expert witness in certain lawsuits. This Article will not address issues on which I was
called to testify. All discussion in this Article is based on publicly available documents and
information.
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What is remarkable is the accumulation of these common features in
these six firms. There is a family resemblance among them: there may
be no single feature common to all or lacking in all the others, but the
combination of a group of features shared by most makes it possible
to identify individuals as members of the same clan or kin. This analy-
sis suggests that a bunching of these features in a single firm may be
cause for concern.ll
1. Massive Growth
An initial, objectively observable category of commonality is the
nova effect. 12 Most of the six firms displayed this feature, even though
they began life as fairly normal examples of their industry. Before
Charles Keating took control of Lincoln Savings, it was a boring, staid
provider of home mortgage finance. Similarly, FAI, which was one of
the chief components within -HIH, was a relatively traditional insur-
ance company. Enron started its life as an unimaginative, regional
natural gas pipeline company. WorldCom began in 1983 as a tiny star-
tup provider of discount long distance services, based in Brookhaven,
Mississippi, "a small town about an hour south of Jackson." 13 The
company is said to have originated from an idea scribbled on the back
of a coffee shop napkin. 14
At some point after those inauspicious beginnings, the firms em-
barked on a course of rampant and radical growth. Usually, this was
accomplished by merger; a firm grows faster by eating up other firms
than by expanding internally. WorldCom was one of the most re-
markable examples of this phenomenon. Known as "one of the most
acquisitive companies in corporate history," in just five years
WorldCom "bought some seventy firms [for consideration] in excess
of $100 billion,"1 5 including a 1998 merger with MCI that allowed
WorldCom to leapfrog to second place in the U.S. telecommunica-
11 Physicians sometimes define disease this way. Certain symptoms might, by them-
selves, be part of normal bodily functioning, or at least not be cause for alarm. But, when a
sufficient number of symptoms appear simultaneously in a patient, the physician may form
at least a tentative diagnosis that a particular disease is present.
12 The term nova comes from the astrological term for certain stars that function
normally for many years, then suddenly heat up and explode in a giant expansion. See
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1546 (1986).
13 Pamela Hamilton, WorldCom's Behavior Disappoints Hometown, PATRIOT NEWS (Harris-
burg, Miss.), June 30, 2002, at D3.
14 See Karen Kaplan, The Odd Couple: Ebbers, Sullivan, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 30,
2002, at Hi.
15 See Business Center: Analysis: Jack Grubman's Testimony on Capitol Hill and His Back-
ground Regarding WorldCom (CNBC television broadcast, July 8, 2002), available at 2002 WL
5794478.
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tions market.16 In addition, WorldCom proposed a $129 billion ac-
quisition of Sprint in 1999, but that deal was prevented because of
objections from U.S. antitrust authorities. 17
HIH also experienced a major growth spurt in the few years
before its failure.18 It purchased the Cotesworth Group in 1998, the
FAI group in January 1999, and World Marine in December 1999. To-
tal assets and revenues for the consolidated firm more than tripled
between 1995 and 2000. Lincoln Savings, Charles Keating's vehicle,
grew fivefold in the space of four years, ballooning from $1 billion in
assets in 1984 to $5 billion in assets in 1988.
2. Questionable Accounting
After these financial failures come to light, it is easy to see what
their problems were. Almost always, these firms manipulated the ac-
counting numbers to disguise problems until they could no longer be
hidden, even with the most creative bookkeeping strategies. Unfortu-
nately, accounting manipulation and fraud is difficult by nature to de-
tect and not readily observable. Thus, these disasters are difficult to
prevent.
In the case of HIH, the questionable accounting involved the
firm's treatment of certain reinsurance contracts that FAI entered
before its acquisition by HIH. It appears that in 1997 or 1998, FAI
management realized that the company had failed to make adequate
provisions for reserves on various lines, and that the shortfall in
reserves would be significant. The performance of several of the com-
pany's longtail insurance portfolios had been far worse than anti-
cipated, and the firm had not been properly reserved. This under-
performance placed the company in perilous financial straits. In an
effort to avoid financial peril, FAI's senior managers negotiated agree-
ments with two reinsurance firms that provided coverage for loss ex-
posures against certain ratios. With these reinsurance agreements in
place, FAI could avoid provisioning for reserves, thereby avoiding the
inevitable hit to the balance sheet and subsequent profit and loss
statement. In fact, FAI could book a profit in the early years of the
reinsurance contract if it designed the premium structure in such a
way that the claims against the reinsurer exceeded the premiums paid.
If the deal succeeded, FAI could continue to project the image of
16 See Sorry, Wrong Number: Endgame, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A12 [hereinafter
Endgame]; Christopher Stern, WorldCom CEO Resigns as Firm's Stock Slumps, WASH. PosT, May
1, 2002, at Al.
17 See Endgame, supra note 16.
18 FAI Insurances, whose acquisition in 1999 contributed materially to HIH's
problems, previously had a growth spurt during the Australian share market boom of 1985
to 1987. During those years, it grew at a compound rate of 45% per year. See Kathryn Bice,
FAI Looks to Its Younger Blood, AUSTL. FIN. REv., Jan. 13, 1988, at 14.
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profitable operations for a substantial period of time, and thus defer
recognition of the losses for accounting purposes, even though the
firm had discovered a shortfall of as much as AUD$100 million in its
reserve provisions. Many insurance companies, not just FAI, played
this game. It worked as long as the insurance regulators in the rele-
vant jurisdiction accepted the reinsurance contract as genuine rather
than as a charade designed to facilitate a stronger accounting
picture. 19
In the case of Enron, faulty accounting treatment of partnership
transactions caused profits to be overstated by approximately one bil-
lion dollars in a single year, according to the Powers Committee. 20
Enron's falsifying strategy involved use of "special purpose entities"
(SPEs). Generally accepted accounting principles provided that a
company doing business with an SPE may treat the SPE as an indepen-
dent, outside entity if two conditions are met: "(1) an owner indepen-
dent of the company must make a substantive equity investment of at
least [three percent] of the SPE's assets, and that [three percent]
must remain at risk throughout the transaction; and (2) the indepen-
dent owner must exercise control of the SPE."21 If these conditions
are met, "the company may record gains and losses on transactions
with the SPE" as if the company incurred harm in bona fide third-
party transactions, and the company does not have to record the SPE's
liabilities on the books.22
Enron used SPEs to disguise losses in its investment portfolio. Al-
though the accounting structure was complex, the essential idea was
simple. In one typical transaction, the SPE would ostensibly hedge
Enron against losses in identified investments by agreeing, for a price,
to pay Enron in the event that the investment decreased in value. In
this way, Enron could avoid disclosing accounting losses on its invest-
ments and could even book a profit if it recognized the payments, but
not the losses, for accounting purposes. This would have been legiti-
mate if the SPEs were genuinely independent vehicles, but Enron had
19 This meant that there had to be some element of genuine risk to the reinsurer.
The challenge for lawyers, actuaries, and business persons was to minimize the insurance
element without going over the line. National Indemnity, one of FAI's reinsurers, inter-
jected risk into the contract by including an extra AUD$30 million "for earthquake insur-
ance that would take effect if an earthquake in Australia caused AUD$5 billion of losses in
one year, and a second earthquake followed in another year during the period of cover-
age[;]" an exceedingly unlikely series of events. See Leslie P. Norton, Australian Insurance
Scandal Embroils Buffett's Firm, BARRON'S, Mar. 4, 2002, at MW10.
20 See WILLIAM C. POWERS,JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTI-
GATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BoARi OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CoRP. 4, at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport020102.pdf (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Pow-
ERS REPORT].
21 Id. at 5.
22 Id.
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actually funded them with its own stock. Thus, when Enron lost
money on investments, it effectively paid itself for the shortfall and
claimed a profit for doing so. Furthermore, because the SPEs held
their Enron stock rather than selling it, they maintained a nondiversi-
fled asset base with which to meet their obligations under the hedging
contracts. The likely correlation between losses in Enron's invest-
ments and reductions in Enron's stock value exacerbated the situa-
tion. If both went south at the same time, as in fact happened, the
SPEs would lack the funds to meet even their formal obligations. This
occurrence forced Enron to recognize the losses in its accounting
numbers, and generated a $544 million after-tax charge against earn-
ings and a $1.2 billion reduction of shareholders' equity.2 3
Another Enron trick was to use an SPE to book gains on invest-
ments in speculative securities, while avoiding the need to account for
losses. For example, Enron invested in a startup technology venture,
Rhythyms Net Communications (Rhythyms Net), for about ten mil-
lion dollars. When Rhythyms Net went public at the peak of the dot-
com bubble, Enron's stake was worth hundreds of millions of dollars.
Although Enron was prohibited from selling the stock outright for a
period of time, the company could pledge the stock. To this end,
Enron utilized a purpose vehicle that would lend Enron money using
its Rhythyms Net stock as collateral. Enron guaranteed the value of
the collateral by promising to compensate for any shortfall by issuing
its own stock to the SPE. Enron was able to book the value of its in-
vestment without any apparent possibility of loss because if the
Rhythyms Net stock decreased in value, Enron would cover the
shortfall with its own stock, which the company would not account for
as a loss.
2 4
As for EIEI, the Japanese property developer, the accounting
scheme was designed to obtain very high appraisals of properties
under development. This was usually easy to do because the banks
were eager to lend, and accordingly, did not scrutinize the valuations
that EIEI placed on the properties. Moreover, appraisers justifiably
gave high valuations, especially to Japanese properties, because the
enormous bubble in the Japanese equity markets had sent property
values to astronomical heights. When the properties turned out to be
worth much less than their appraised valuation, banks did not de-
mand a revaluation because that would have required them to ac-
23 See id. at 2.
24 See Collapse of Enron Corp.: Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. (2002) (statement of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University
of San Diego School of Law), available at 2002 WL 89765 [hereinafter Statement of Frank
Partnoy].
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knowledge the loans on their books, thus revealing the severe
weakness of their own financial condition.
Like EIEI, Lincoln Savings also used ambitious appraisals to
shield its balance sheet, and engaged in poor documentation of its
loan portfolio. 25 Because Lincoln had invested heavily in real estate,
an asset notoriously difficult to appraise accurately, it was able to keep
these assets on its books at a high valuation even when property values
plummeted in 1987.26
3. Questionable Accountants
Employing questionable accountants to audit a firm's books is an-
other cause for concern. However, determining whether an account-
ant is questionable may be difficult: large accounting firms employ
thousands of accountants. Perhaps only a few violate ethical stan-
dards, and even accountants make mistakes. Accordingly, it might be
unfair to label a company as at risk of collapse based solely on suspi-
cions about its accountant unless reliable sources show that the ac-
countant is willing to cut corners in clients' books.
Frequent changes in accounting firms are a more objective cause
for concern. Previous auditors may have raised questions about the
financial statements that the company did not want to address. Alter-
natively, an auditor may have withdrawn from an account because she
was unwilling to certify the numbers proposed by the company's book-
keepers. Frequent changes in auditors-the use of three or more au-
ditors within a ten year period-is therefore behavior that raises a
cause for concern, although this charge alone is not evidence of
wrongdoing.
4. Poor Underlying Performance
Another warning signal is subpar company performance. How-
ever, profit and loss statements often obscure this. A company may
inflate its profits by selling appreciated assets or may recognize in-
come before it is received. Nevertheless, generally accepted account-
ing principles limit a company's ability to disguise poor performance
over the long run. Unless outright fraud exists, analysts skilled at deci-
phering financial statements should be able to identify persistent peri-
ods of poor performance.
25 See Michael Binstein, A Study in Power: How S&L 'War' Led Senators To Pressure Regula-
tors, WASH. POST, May 15, 1988, at Hl, available at 1988 WL 2052835.
26 See generally Emily Benedek, Crashing to Earth: Where Hotshot Entrepreneur Ernie Garcia
Was Flying, the Air Got Thin, ARiz. TREND, Oct. 1, 1988, available at 1988 WL 2456333
(describing the crash in Arizona's real estate market); Jonathan R. Laing, Phoenix Descend-
ing: Is Boomtown U.S.A. Going Bust?, BARRON'S, Dec. 19, 1988, at 28 (describing the potential
for manipulating real estate appraisals).
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As the operating performance of a company deteriorates, the
temptation for fraud can become very great. There is evidence, for
example, that the financial picture at FAI was substantially overstated
as a result of very large under-reserving against policy losses. 27
Even market recognition of poor underlying performance may
not be enough to trigger a market reaction that disciplines managers
and averts disaster. Where sufficient buzz about a company or a lack
of strong market discipline exists, the firm may be able to continue
undisciplined for a substantial period of time. The dot-coms are a
prime example. Most of them never turned a profit and never had a
realistic prospect of doing so-at least when analyzed in hindsight.
Yet because of the buzz of investor enthusiasm, their poor-perhaps
nonexistent-operating performance failed to trigger market correc-
tion, and they were able to continue operations unchecked.
Several of our disaster stories displayed poor operating perform-
ance. HIH is a case in point. FAI, which HIH acquired in 1998, had a
history of losses in its insurance underwriting business. Its actuarial
practices appear to have been poor, and it priced its policies very com-
petitively.28 The short-term result was rapid growth in FAI's portfolio
and a temporary period of cheap policies for its customers. In the
long term, however, even company insiders considered the perform-
ance of the insurance business unsustainable 29 because FAI's profits
derived from speculative investments, which had generated abnormal
profits for some time.30
Enron, too, experienced poor operating performance in the
years prior to its bankruptcy. Its core business of making merchant
investments had experienced very large losses. To conceal heavy
losses in this core business, management created the illusion that the
losses had been hedged by contracts with independent parties, who
were obligated to assume the incidence of loss. 31
Lincoln Savings also demonstrated poor operating performance.
As a thrift institution, its ordinary business would have been to take
deposits and make loans, with profit coming from the spread between
the cost of deposits and the interest received on the loans. Lincoln
Savings, however, chose to invest many of its assets in real estate rather
than in loans. During the real estate boom in the sunbelt during the
27 See HIH ROYAL COMM'N, THE FAILURE OF HIH INSURANCE (2003), available at www.
hihroyalcom.gov.au/financialreport.
28 See, e.g., lain McDonald, Australian Insurance Trouble Is Deep-Seated, ASIAN WALL ST.J.,
May 1, 2002, at A3.
29 Id.
30 See Geoffrey Guild Hill, Witness Statement before the HIH Royal Commission
41-42 (May 10, 2002), at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Documents/Hill/pdf [hereinaf-
ter Witness Statement of Geoffrey Guild Hill].
31 See PowERs REPORT, supra note 20, at 4.
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1970s and 1980s, which saw the population of the Phoenix metropoli-
tan area double in fifteen years, 32 this would have been an excellent
investment. But by 1987, the sunbelt real state market was quickly
souring. 33 As of September 30, 1986, Lincoln Savings reported "a
$945 million differential between interest-bearing liabilities and inter-
est-earning assets." 34 To break even on these assets and liabilities, the
firm would have had to earn a positive weighted average interest rate
spread of 3.46% on that date, when in fact, it was earning only
0.45%. 3 5
EIEI never displayed real profits either. Its apparent profitability
during the few years of its ascendency was due to the massive increase
in the value of its assets that accompanied the bubble economy. Once
the firm had embarked on its splurge of investments, EIEI never gen-
erated enough cash flow from operations to service its debt, much less
to generate a profit.36 If it needed to repay a loan, it could simply sell
an asset and reap a huge profit. EIEI was so dependent on appreciat-
ing property values that its top managers never even drew up a realis-
tic plan for servicing their debt in the event that the real estate market
dropped and the value of its properties plummeted.
5. Political Connections
Another feature common to many of these cases is the presence
of a high level of political activism by company leaders. Charles Keat-
ing, Jr.'s political powers were legendary. 37 Hailing from a well-con-
nected Cincinnati family (his brother had been a Republican
congressman), 38 Keating also vocally supported Republican politicians
and briefly directed Texas Governor John Connolly's 1980 presiden-
tial campaign. 39 Keating greased the political wheels with large politi-
cal contributions. 40  In 1983, when the Phoenix City Council
considered a proposal to ban artificial lakes-a hallmark of Keating's
developments-he reportedly gave so much money to candidates that
the council changed its election financing rules to preclude such do-
32 See Laing, supra note 26, at 28.
23 See Michael Weiss, Overdone in the Sun: Phoenix Struggles To Rise from Ashes of Building
Bust, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 13, 1988, at 1D.
34 Robert Luke, More Problems for Thrift with Regulator Link: Lincoln Savings' Profits De-
crease Sharply in 1986, AM. BANKER, Feb. 23, 1987, at 1, available at 1987 WL 5522221.
35 Id.
36 See Eric Ellis, The Takahashi Vision of a Splendid Empire in the Pacific, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Dec. 14, 1988, at 35.
37 See Laing, supra note 26, at 28.
38 See Binstein, supra note 25.
39 RoyJ. Harris, Jr., Fighting Back: Keating, Under Attack in Lincoln S&L Mess, Blames the
Regulators, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1989, at 1.
40 See James S. Granelli & Claudia Luther, Lincoln S&L Owner Spent Lavishly To Gain
Political Influence, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 1989, at 1.
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nations in the future.41 Keating also was an early player in soft money
donations. According to a study by the Center for Responsive Politics,
which examined soft money donations in five states during the 1985
to 1986 election cycle, Keating gave $85,000 through his firm to the
California Democratic Party. This was one of the two largest soft
money donations in that state. Displaying admirable bipartisanship,
Keating also funneled $100,000 of his own money to the Florida Re-
publican Party, thereby making the largest soft money donation iden-
tified in the study.42  Keating also made substantial political
contributions to individual candidates. When Lincoln Savings began
to experience serious financial problems in 1987, Keating became em-
broiled in an acrimonious dispute with Edwin Gray, Chairman of the
thrift regulatory agency then known as the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB). After the FHLBB conducted a yearlong examina-
tion of Lincoln Savings, Keating enlisted five U.S. senators-who had
all received campaign contributions from Keating and his associates-
to meet with federal regulators and pressure them to end their investi-
gation 43 and to complain about alleged over-regulation and unfair
treatment. Keating even retained Alan Greenspan, former Chairman
of the President's Council of Economic Advisors and future Federal
Reserve Board Chairman, to conduct a study favoring Keating's views
on deregulation. 44
Keating also managed to wield indirect influence by employing
former government regulators, who could be expected to influence
their former colleagues.45 His sensitivity to political influence ex-
tended to choice of counsel: when he needed approval from Califor-
nia officials for a controversial plan to sell uninsured subordinated
debentures in the lobbies of Lincoln Savings, he hired a law firm
whose senior partner was the chief fundraiser for California Governor
George Deukmejian. 46
EIEI's Harunori Takahashi was also a master at amassing influ-
ence by catering to politicians. Injapan, he reportedly spent a consid-
41 Teresa Carson, Keating, Owner of Seized Thrift, Is in Eye of Storm, Am. BANKER, May 1,
1989, at 1, available at 1989 WL 7315544.
42 Corporate Donations Get Through Loophole, ORANGE COUNTY REG., June 13, 1988, at
A9.
43 See Meddling and Misjudgment, PLAIN DEALER, July 16, 1989, at 2E. One of these
senators, Alan Cranston of California, subsequently received $850,000 in contributions
from Keating for voter registration drives, which included $400,000 for a project organized
by Senator Cranston's son. See Beth Barrett, Cranston Aided S&L, Got Voter Sign-up Funds
Lincoln's Parent Company Reportedly Gave $400,000, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 16, 1989,
available at 1989 WIL 6217399.
44 James S. Granelli, Big-Name Staff at Issue in Lincoln S&L Furor, Critics Charge, L.A.
TIMES, May 7, 1989, Part IV, at 7.
45 See id.
46 Jerry Roberts & Robert B. Gunnison, State's Role Questioned in S&L Deal, S.F.
CHRON., June 27, 1989, at 1, available at 1989 WL 7147834.
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erable amount of money entertaining government officials and he
eventually purchased a high class restaurant in Tokyo to facilitate this
entertaining.47 He bought 60 million yen of tickets to a fundraising
party for a leading politician and furnished him with a rent-free apart-
ment in Tokyo. 48 Takahashi also lent billions of yen to Toshio
Yamaguchi, a leader of one of the Japanese political factions and one-
time labor minister.49 He reportedly flew half the ruling junta of Fiji,
on one of his private jets, to ajunket in Tokyo.5 0 Further, Takahashi
did not ignore the power of Japan's bureaucracy. He is reported to
have wined and dined senior officials of the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) and to have catered to junior officials whom he saw as rising
stars in the Ministry. 51 Two senior MOF officials were actually cen-
sured for too-close contacts with Takahashi: "One of them, Hiroaki
Taya, had accepted a free ride to Hong Kong on Takahashi's jet, and
enjoyed expensive nights out that reportedly included 'pricey call
girls.' The other, Yoshio Nakajima.... also accepted... Takahashi's
hospitality and committed [several] other indiscretions." 52
Enron also exercised political connections to the fullest extent
possible. According to a 2000 survey of business executives, its chair-
man, Kenneth Lay, was one of the top fifty individual donors of soft
money, with contributions totaling more than $361,000.53 Lay was a
major contributor to President George W. Bush's campaigns, and he
was at one time a candidate for Secretary of the Treasury in that ad-
ministration. 54 Although Enron was widely associated with Republi-
can causes, it spread its largesse in bipartisan fashion. At the 2000
Democratic National Convention, Enron sponsored "a lunch honor-
ing [Senator] Bob Kerrey of Nebraska, . . . a breakfast for the Califor-
nia delegation [,] and events for Texas and New Mexico Democrats."55
47 Buckets of Money from "'Reckless'" LTCB Kept Big Spender Afloat, AsArI EVENING NEWS,
July 23, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WL 12788878 [hereinafter Buckets of Money].
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See id.
51 See ULRIKE SCHAEDE, THE 1995 FINANCIAL CRISIS IN JA AN (BRIE Working Paper No.
85, 1996), available at http://brie.berkeley.edu/-briewww/pubs/wp/wp85.html.
52 Edward W. Desmond, How the Mighty Have Fallen Once the Engine ofJapan's Economy,
the Elite Finance Ministry, Is Facing Unprecedented Attacks on Its Competence and Power, TIME
IN-Fr'L, Feb. 19, 1996, at 12, available at 1996 WIL 8824767; Kwan Weng Kin, Japanese Official
"Cautioned" over Free Plane Ride, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 14, 1995, available at 1995
WL 15551571; Michael Williams, How Japan's Banks Befriend Bureaucrats: A Party-Going Offi-
cial Drew Favors from Highfliers in Real Estate, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 1996, at 5.
53 See Karen Masterson, Businesses Feel Strains of Political "'Shakedown'", HouS. CHRON.,
Oct. 19, 2000, at IA.
54 See Campaign Donors Take Seats at Presidential Advisory Table, AUGUSTA CHRON., Dec.
31, 2000, at 9A.
55 Jake Thompson & C. David Kotok, Big Business Parties with Democrats: Delegates, Politi-
cians Treated to Fine Dining, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 17, 2000, at 9, available at 2000 WL
4371032.
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Enron was also savvy at hiring politically connected individuals: "En-
ron and its affiliates . .. hired . . .former Secretary of State James
Baker and former Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher," both of
whom had served in the administration of President George Bush. 56
HIH also sought the benefit of political connections. HIH and
FAI together contributed a majority of the insurance industry's dona-
tions to political parties between 1994 and 2000.57 Rodney Adler of
FAI is a former president of the Insurance Council of Australia, the
industry lobbying group.58
WorldCom has given $7.5 million to politicians since 1989.
Republicans received 54%, and Democrats received 46%. "For the
2002 election, the company... [reportedly] split $1 million in dona-
tions 50-50 between the parties."59
Of the institutions under study here, BCCI was undoubtedly the
most politically active. Its chairman, Agha Hansan Abedi, assiduously
courted former President Carter and prominent members of his ad-
ministration. He accompanied President Carter on a visit to Thailand
and pledged $250,000 to Carter's Global 2000 program. 60 Overall,
BCCI donated millions of dollars to Carter's pet charity, and it was the
largest single donor to the operation. 6'
One of Abedi's favorite tactics was to obtain support from some-
one of impeccable reputation and wide-ranging influence. He found
the perfect representative in Clark Clifford, 6minence grise of Washing-
ton's political establishment and advisor to numerous former presi-
dents. 62 Clifford and his associate, Robert Altman, provided lucrative
legal services to BCCI for years. They were also accused of acting as
fronts for BCCI in its efforts to infiltrate the American banking indus-
try through the secret acquisition of a controlling interest in First
American Bankshares, a medium-sized commercial bank holding
company doing most of its business in Virginia, Maryland, and Wash-
ington, D.C. 63
Abedi also recruited another powerful political insider, Bert
Lance, who was a crony of President Carter and former head of
56 Bush, Enron Provide Generous Support to Each Other, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 30,
2000, at 7, available at 2000 IATL 4383957.
57 HIH Generous with Shareholders' Cash to Liberals, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 15,
2001, at 2001 WL 21611570.
58 See id.
59 See As Business Scandals Mount, Both Parties Share Blame, USA TODAY, July 8, 2002, at
SlIA.
60 See Bill Kovach, Life After the White House: Tireless fimmy Carter Remains a Major Player
Among World's Leaders, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., July 12, 1987, at Al.
61 Peter Truell & Andy Pasztor, U.S. Law Officials Seek To Determine BCCI Officers'Know-
ledge of Laundering, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1988, at A4.
62 See generally CLARK CLIFFORD, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT: A MEMOIR (1991).
63 See In re Clifford, No. 92-080-E-I1, 1997 WL 829314, at *1 (F.R.B. Jan. 14, 1997).
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Carter's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) .64 After resigning
as head of the OMB in the wake of embarrassing disclosures of poten-
tial conflicts of interest in his prior service at a Georgia bank, Lance
returned to manage the National Bank of Georgia.65 Abedi retained
Lance to assist him in finding ways to enter the U.S. banking market.66
When Lance ran out of money and needed to sell the bank, Abedi
purchased the institution through a nominee, Ghaith Pharaoh. 67
Through Lance, Abedi met Clifford and Altman, who represented
Lance in the sale of the Georgia bank.68
Abedi's actions in the United States, catering to President Carter
and members of his administration as well as to other influential
power brokers, typified his modus operandi. 69
6. Firm's Domination by a Single Individual or Small Group
Lincoln Savings, EIEI, WorldCom, FAI, HIH, and BCCI all pro-
vide examples of business institutions being dominated by a single in-
dividual. For example, Lincoln Savings and its affiliate, American
Continental, became the tools of the mephistophelian Charles Keat-
ing, Jr., who founded neither institution but molded both to his will.
American Continental was a struggling home builder; under Keating's
regime, it became a major developer, investor in financial institutions,
and player in corporate takeover markets.70 Lincoln Savings under-
went a similar transformation under Keating's rule, evolving from a
stodgy, traditional savings and loan to a high-flying player in distinctly
new and untested markets. 71 Keating maintained control over these
firms by holding a forty-nine percent personal stake, appointing fam-
ily members to high management positions, and surrounding himself
with loyal subjects. 72 Keating was an imposing and distinctive figure:
At six feet five inches, he towered over the landscape of his compa-
nies. He also imposed his personal tastes on his empire, demanding
that his employees be neat, well groomed, enthusiastic, and attrac-
64 See generally BERT LANE WITH BILL GILBERT, THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER: My LIFE IN
AND OUT OF POLITICS (1991).
65 See Bob Kelly, Any Former Cabinet Secretay? Satterfield Again Tries To Put Wheels on
Airport Proposal, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 2, 2002, at 4A.
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 For example, he enjoyed personal connections with members of the royal families
of several Arab leaders. See Kathleen Day, Investors in Bank Tied to Drug Probe Have Local
Ties, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1988, at Cl.
70 See Jerry Roberts & Robert B. Garrison, Puzzling Figure in the S&L Scandal, S.F.
CHRON., July 21, 1989, at 1, available at 1989 WL 7151276.
71 See id.
72 One employee gushed, "The guy has always been kind of an idol to me," and added
that Keating "is the most brilliant financial mind in the state, and his generosity is legend."
See id.
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tive. 73 "[T] he pulchritude of the secretarial pool" at American Conti-
nental was legendary in Phoenix.7 4
EIEI, the Japanese bubble conglomerate, was similarly dominated
by Harunori Takahashi. Takahashi was the founder of the firm and
the nucleus of all its activities. He was free to act whimsically and to
squander EIEI's money because the firm was privately held. In Austra-
lia, Takahashi is famous for having purchased the Regent Sydney Ho-
tel for AUD$145 million after he noticed it from his limousine. 75
Takahashi was such a prominent figure that the press developed vari-
ous nicknames for him, including "Baburu Shinshi," or "Bubble Gen-
tleman," which was a reference to the Japanese bubble economy he
epitomized. 7 6
Enron, unlike the other five firms, was too large to be dominated
by a single individual. At one time, it was the seventh largest firm in
the United States for market capitalization. Its public shareholders,
including institutional investors, would have objected to control by a
single individual. Yet this did not stop Enron from being controlled
by a small group. This clique included Kenneth Lay (former CEO
and Chairman), Jeffrey Skilling (former President and COO), and An-
drew Fastow (former Executive Vice President and CFO).
The dominating figure at WorldCom was Bernie Ebbers. His
story, at least as it was embellished prior to his disgrace, has some of
the mythic elements one associates with American historical figures
such as Abraham Lincoln. Born to a poor family in Edmonton, Al-
berta, Ebbers took a job delivering milk after graduating from high
school, "sometimes in temperatures that reached [thirty] degrees be-
low zero." 77 Like Keating, Ebbers, at six feet four inches, was an im-
posing physical presence. An athlete, he attended college on a
basketball scholarship, "graduated... with a degree in physical educa-
tion, and became a high school [physical education] teacher and bas-
ketball coach." 78 Like the other CEO's studied here, Ebbers had
unshakeable optimism. In fact, it was this optimism that got him into
trouble. Ebbers borrowed against his stock in the expectation that it
would continue to rise. When the stock fell, he had no means to re-
pay his loans.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 Buckets of Money, supra note 47.
76 See Donald Maclntyre, The Road to Ruin: The Bizarre Tale of the "Bubble Gentleman"and
a Failed Bank Helps Explain How Japan Got into Trouble-and Why Recovery Won't Be Easy, TIME
INT'L, Nov. 9, 1998, available at 1998 WL 21377887.
77 Kaplan, supra note 14.
78 Id.
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Rodney Adler, the CEO of FAI, individually and through his fam-
ily held a controlling stake in the company.79 Like EIEI's Takahashi,
Adler was the son of the institution's founder ° and maintained con-
trol over a family company which operated separately from, but in
cooperation with, the doomed firm, FAI.81
HIH, the insurance company that acquired FAI, also had a domi-
nating figure: Raymond Williams. Williams founded the firm and re-
mained its chief until being forced out shortly before its final
collapse.8 2
Of all the firms discussed, perhaps the firm where the leader's
personality was most dominant was BCCI. Abedi, who founded the
firm in 1972, undoubtedly masterminded one of the longest frauds in
history. Abedi possessed enormous charm, a charismatic personality,
and nearly limitless capacities for good or evil that mesmerized those
who came into contact with him.8 3
7. Exceptionally Rapid Growth
All of the firms considered here displayed exceptionally rapid
growth in a short period of time. Keating's Lincoln Savings grew five-
fold in a four-year span, ballooning from $4 billion in assets in 1984 to
$5 billion in 1998. Similarly, HIH went through a major growth spurt
in the few years before its failure. 84 It purchased the Cotesworth
Group in 1998, the FAI group in January 1999, and World Marine in
December 1999. Total assets and revenues for the consolidated firm
79 PeterJohn O'Connell, Witness Statement Before the HIH Royal Comm'n (May 13,
2002), available at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Documents/Statements/Oconnel.pdf
[hereinafter Witness Statement of Peter John O'Connell].
80 John Landerer, Witness Statement Before the HIH Royal Comm'n (May 10, 2002),
available at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Documents/Statements/Landerer.pdf [here-
inafter Witness Statement of John Landerer].
81 See Gavin Lower, Adler Banned from Being Company Director for 20 Years, AAP NEWS,
May 31, 2002, available at 2002 WL 21143481.
82 See Former HIH Boss Rumoured To Be on Legal Aid for Inquiry, AAP NEWS, Mar. 6, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 14574556. Williams and a colleague founded HIH's predecessor as an
underwriter of insurance for two Lloyd's syndicates, primarily in the area of workers' com-
pensation. See HIH ROYAL COMM'N, 1 INDEX TO CORPORATE INFORMATION 4 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Documents/C1V/011-12.pdf. It was acquired by a
public insurance company listed in the United Kingdom in 1971, and thereafter it ex-
panded into other kinds of insurance including public, property, commercial, and profes-
sional liability. Id. The firm also started underwriting workers' compensation policies in
California. Id.
83 For background on Abedi, see SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG.,
REPORT ON THE BCCI AFFAIR (Comm. Print 1992) (Sen. John Kerry & Sen. Hank Brown).
84 FAI Insurances, whose acquisition in 1999 contributed materially to HIH's
problems, previously had a growth spurt during the Australian stock market boom of 1985
to 1987. During those years, FAI grew at a compound rate of forty-five percent per year.
See Bice, supra note 18.
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more than tripled between 1995 and 2000.85 Most of this growth
came from British and American companies, which represented a dra-
matically increasing share of HIH Groups' revenues from 1995 to
2000.86 But these investments were unwise, at least in retrospect; after
showing initial profitability, both plunged into debt.87
EIEI, the Japanese real estate developer, started as a small firm on
a back street of Tokyo's Ginza district.88 With about only fifty employ-
ees in 1995,89 EIEI rapidly purchased resort properties and developed
golf courses in Japan and around the world.90 When the Japanese
bubble economy collapsed in 1991, EIEI had total debt of more than
$11 billion.91
BCCI also displayed enormous growth in the years before its col-
lapse. Starting with total assets of $200 million in 1973, BCCI grew to
$2.2 billion in 1977 and to more than $20 billion in 1988.92 Similarly,
its geographic reach exploded, growing from nineteen branches in
five countries in 1973 to 146 branches in thirty-two countries in 1977,
and 417 branches in seventy-three countries in 1990. 9 3 In 1988, The
Wall Street Journal described BCCI as "one of the fastest-growing banks
in the world."94 In 1989, BCCI was among the top 300 global banks in
terms of deposits. 95 BCCI ranked worldwide as the seventh-largest pri-
vately owned financial institution in 1998 and the fifth largest in
1990.96
8. Lavish Expenditures
Whenever a company becomes insolvent, the press tends to re-
port the excessive expenditures made by senior management in the
months or years preceding the insolvency. But, the expenditures dis-
played by the firms in our sample seem excessive even in hindsight.
HIH's end-of-year parties were known as some of the most lavish in
Australia's business world. Its client appreciation parties, held at Syd-
85 Report of the HIH Royal Commission, Vol. 1, § 3, available at http://www.hihroyal
com.gov.au/finalreport/chapter%203.html.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Buckets of Money, supra note 47.
89 See Peter Hartcher, Boom to Bust: A Story About a Bank, AuSTL. FIN. REV., Oct. 23,
1998, at 38.
90 See MacIntyre, supra note 76.
91 Hartcher, supra note 89.
92 How BCCI Grew and Grew, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1990, at 84, available at 1990 WL
8870019.
93 See id.
94 Peter Truell, Luxembourg-Based but Global, BCCI Is One of the Fastest-Growing Banks,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1988, at BlI.
95 The Top 500 Banks in the World; U.S. and Overseas Banks Ranked by Deposits, AM.
BANKER, July 30, 1989, at 48, available at 1989 WL 7317494.
96 Bank Accused of LaunderingDrug Money, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 12, 1998, at IA.
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ney's Regent Hotel, featured entertainment by well-known musi-
cians.9 7 The media roasted HIH's chief officers Williams and Adler
for their allegedly lavish lifestyles and unconstrained expenditures.
98
Williams lived in a "palatial Gwanda Bay manor," drove a Rolls Royce,
and worked out of a "salubrious office-cum-dining room."99
Keating's generosity was legendary. Like HIH, American Conti-
nental had a reputation for hosting extravagant employee parties.100
Keating reportedly gave an executive $100,000 to quit smoking, 10 1
while other employees received bonuses of shopping sprees and lux-
ury cars.102 Keating, like EIEI's Takahashi, used three corporate
jets.1 03
Enron's spending habits were also famous in the corporate world.
Its Christmas parties were known as sumptuous affairs. Even in 2001,
as the firm headed for bankruptcy, it planned for a $1.5 million
Christmas bash at Enron Field. 10 4 Enron rewarded secretaries with
spa visits and Waterford crystal. 10 5 No gesture seemed too lavish or
extravagant. 106 The company flew in more than 300 of its vice presi-
dents from around the globe to a luxury resort in Beaver Creek, Colo-
rado, for three days of skiing.10 7 For a firm "family picnic, Enron
rented the [eighty-five]-acre Astroworld amusement park." One divi-
sion regularly brought a live elephant to enliven employee meetings.
Another division spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to build a
mock trading floor, solely to impress equity analysts at a confer-
ence. 10 8 When Enron's shares rose over $50 in 1998, "the company
left $100 bills on each employee's desk." 109 Enron's London head-
quarters, a sumptuous building in one of the city's toniest neighbor-
hoods, cost $74 million to build.110 Enron also matched these
gestures with more substantive actions: it paid salaries at or above the
97 Emiliya Mychasuk & Sue Lecky, Going Pear-Shaped on Expansion Trail, SYDNEY MORN-
INc HERALD, Apr. 7, 2001, at 47, available at 2001 WVL 18180240.
98 See Sue Lecky, Auditors Are Called to Account, SYDNEY MORNIN-G HERALD, June 2, 2001,
at 45, available at 2001 IAL 21614026.
99 Mychasuk & Lecky, supra note 97.
100 See Harris, supra note 39.
101 Jenni Peters, On the Run: Corporate Cup Illustrates Businesses' Commitment to Fitness,
STATE TIMES (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 25, 1985, at 3F, available at 1985 WL 4109188.
102 See Carson, supra note 41.
103 See id.
104 "Nobody Went Like Enron". Failed Energy Firm Spent Freely on Luxury and Image, J. REc.
(Okla. City), Feb. 28, 2002, at 19, available at 2002 WL 4934187 [hereinafter Nobody Went
Like Enron].
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Andrew Taylor & Matthew Jones, London Enron Traders Set for £24m Bonus, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at 1.
108 See id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
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top of its market and provided perks to employees such as first-class
travel and generous expense accounts.' 1 Enron managers were fa-
mous in Houston for driving expensive cars' 1 2 and building mansions
in the town's best neighborhoods. 1 3
9. Disproportionate Compensation for Top Managers
In addition to spending lavishly on perks for all employees, the
firms in the sample appeared particularly generous with senior man-
agers. According to data prepared by the Royal Commission, senior
executives of HIH consistently received salary increases greater than
those given to staff, and those increases were regularly approved by
the firm's human resources committee without the benefit of inde-
pendent advice and in the absence of clear performance criteria. 114
The situation was similar at Lincoln Savings. Keating was the sec-
ond highest paid executive in the U.S. thrift industry in 1987, earning
$1.95 million, which was 10% more than his compensation the previ-
ous year, even though the institution's earnings fell 19.9% during the
same period. 1 5 In 1988, as his companies were collapsing into one of
the most notorious bankruptcies in American history, his compensa-
tion increased to $2.95 million. 116 Keating was nearly as generous
with other senior managers (several of them family relations); in one
survey, American Continental boasted six of the ten best paid execu-
tives in Arizona.117
At BCCI, although the compensation Abedi or his deputy, Naqvi,
received will probably never be known, it undoubtedly was large. Clif-
ford and Altman, the Americans alleged to have conspired with Abedi
to facilitate his takeover of First American Bankshares, were also richly
compensated for their services. Although Clifford himself received
the paltry sum of $50,000 for his services as Chairman of the bank-a
fact his defenders frequently noted-he allegedly received very gener-
ous remuneration from BCCI in the form of beneficial loans and prof-
itable stock transactions." l8
111 See Nobody Went Like Enron, supra note 104.
112 See NBC News: Profile: Lifestyles of Enron Executives (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 1,
2002), available at 2002 WL 3337083.
113 For more on Vinson & Elkins, see PowERs REPORT, supra note 20, at 10.
114 Report of the HIH Royal Commission, the Failure of HIH: A Corporate Collapse
and its Lessons, Vol. III, § 23, available at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/finalreport/
chapter%2023.html.
115 See Linda Ellis, Thrift CEO Pay Rose 13% in '87, AM. BANKER, July 1, 1988, at 10,
available at 1988 WL 6183106. Keating's spokesperson justified the salary on the ground
that the parent institution, which had substantial nonthrift profits, paid the salary. Id.
116 See Public Companies, ARiz. TREND, June 1, 1989, at 31, available at 1989 WL 2658518.
117 See Harris, supra note 39.
118 See In re Clifford, No. 92-080-E-I1, 1997 WL 829314, at*18-19 (F.R.B.Jan. 14, 1997).
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Enron's top officials were also exceedingly well compensated. In
2000, three of Enron's executives were among the highest paid in
Texas. Lay was the third highest paid executive in the state, with com-
pensation of $5.2 million.' 9
10. Sudden, Drastic Changes in the Nature of the Business
As with several of the spectacular savings and loan failures of the
1980s, Lincoln began and spent most of its corporate life in the sleepy
backwaters of home mortgage finance. Prior to the mid-1980s, its
main claim to fame was that it was the repository of a draft of Lin-
coln's Gettysburg Address for two years during the 1960s. 120 All this
changed in 1985, when the California legislature enacted a law per-
mitting state-chartered savings and loans to invest up to all of their
assets in real estate development. 121 When Keating bought the com-
pany in 1984, in anticipation of the new real estate investment powers,
he immediately moved in the direction of nontraditional finance. He
abandoned the mainstay of the traditional savings and loan business,
which was writing mortgages on single-family homes. 122 In its place,
he substituted real estate development, securities investment, and in-
vestment banking. By the end of 1986, Lincoln had more than $900
million invested in real estate. 123 Lincoln became a major purchaser
of junk bonds (the market that Michael Milkin had practically cre-
ated), with about ten percent of its $4.9 billion assets invested in those
securities. 124 It also delved into investment banking, supporting lever-
aged buyouts and other corporate control transactions.1 25
Similarly, although HIH ostensibly remained an insurance com-
pany, the nature of the insurance contracts it underwrote changed
dramatically during the period of its rapid expansion. By acquiring
FAI in 1998, HIH took over a general insurer that was a major player
in investment advice and home mortgage origination. FAI also had
major investments in a number of nonfinancial firms, including the
largest home security distributor in Australia. 126 HIH became in-
119 See Highest-Paid Executives of Public Companies, Hous. Bus. J., June 9, 2000, at 12B,
available at 2000 W. 16624707.
120 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS: ISSUES RELATED TO
DISPLAY AND PRESERVATION 2 (1994).
121 SeeJoe Cole, Develaper-Controlled Thrift Bows to Regulators, AM. BANKER, Dec. 8, 1987,
at 3.
122 See David B. Hilder, Lincoln S&L Is Set to Name Hinz Chief- Move May Ease Rift with
Bank Board, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1987, at 36.
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 See, e.g., Wolken, Ex-Kroger Exec, Hungy for Fa. Food, Liquor Business, DRUG STORE
NEWS, Jan. 23, 1989, at 3.
126 See Rodney Adler, Witness Testimony Before the HIH Royal Comm'n 7924 (May 6,
2002), available at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Documents/Transcript/Transcript_
2002_0605.pdf [hereinafter Witness Testimony of Rodney Adler].
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volved, through the purchase of the Cotesworth Group, in the under-
writing of Lloyd's syndicates through limited liability corporate capital
vehicles.1 27 In addition to plunging into the rocky shoals of Lloyd's,
HIH became involved in unusual lines of insurance that basically
made the firm a coadventurer with operating companies in highly
risky fields of business. One unusual type of insurance that the firm
involved itself with was film finance insurance, under which, for a sub-
stantial upfront premium, an insurer essentially guarantees investors
that the film revenues will cover production costs. Another new HIH
business was stop loss insurance. At the time of its failure, the HIH
group dealt in some fourteen classes of insurance. 128
Enron also shifted its business focus in the years prior to its col-
lapse. Originally, and for most of its corporate life, Enron was a natu-
ral gas pipeline company. Even in 1997, the natural gas pipeline
business accounted for approximately half of Enron's revenues. 129
Three years later, pipelines represented only about twenty percent of
Enron's revenues. 130 The change was not due to a reduction in pipe-
line activities, but rather to Enron's massive growth in other busi-
nesses.13' Most notably, Enron engaged in the wholesale energy
business and online trading, as well as metals trading, risk manage-
ment services, paper and pulp trading, and broadband services. 132
An important common feature in the changes of these compa-
nies' business is a shift from receiving income from core operations to
receiving income from investments. For example, FAI evolved from
about ninety percent insurance income and ten percent investment
income in 1988 to about a fifty-fifty split in 1999.133
11. Business Combinations That Don't Appear To Make Sense
Several of the firms in our sample consisted of combinations of
functions that appeared to make little operational sense. EIEI is an
excellent example. EIEI had a vast network of businesses, many of
them concentrated in the real estate and leisure development indus-
127 See The Enron Down Under, supra note 5.
128 See Richard Charles Wilkinson, Witness Testimony Before the HIH Royal Comm'n
4-11 (Dec. 6, 2001), available at at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Documents/State-
ments/Wilkinson.pdf [hereinafter Witness Statement of Richard Charles Wilkinson].
129 See Jeff Share, Enron Still an Energy Company, Lay Tells Dain Rauscher Forum, PIPELINE
& GAS J., Nov. 2000, at 42, available at 2000 WL 18077020.
130 See id.
131 See Terry Maxon, Trading Up: Enron Goes from Sleepy Utility to Global E-Commerce
Leader, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 2, 2000, at IH, available at 2000 ATL 23714568.
132 See Cindy A. Adams, Energetic Enron's 1999 Performance Scores No. 1 Spot, Hous. Bus.
J., June 9, 2000, at 5B, available at 2000 WL 16624701; Press Release, Official Opening of Enron
Japan Office, API ENCOMPASS: NEWS, Oct. 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 28465784.
133 Witness Testimony of Rodney Adler, supra note 126, at 7924.
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try.13 4 During its brief heyday from 1997 to 1999, the firm seemed to
acquire anything that interested its Chairman. For example, during
his travels throughout the Pacific Rim, Takahashi decided to purchase
airlines. He purchased significant stakes in Fiji's Air Pacific and Air
Caledonie, entered talks with the King of Tonga about establishing a
flag carrier for that nation, and negotiated for an ownership stake in
Air New Zealand.
13 5
12. Operational Mystery
Another common feature of these firms is that even informed
observers were unclear about how exactly the firms made money.
This was particularly true of EIEI. Australian journalist Eric Ellis re-
marked humorously, but aptly, that EIEI appeared to display "many of
the characteristics of the famous Playtex cross-your-heart bra-a
unique contraption difficult to undo, with no visible means of support
except to those of intimate association." 136 EIEI operated with one of
the largest debt burdens of any firm in the world and had virtually no
operational income other than what it could raise by selling assets.
Yet Bungo Ishizaki, Takahashi's flamboyant advisor, blithely portrayed
this indebtedness as a strength rather than a weakness. He observed
that "[i] n Japan debt is a good thing, it's a net credit."137
13. Image Management
Each of the firms in our sample was deeply concerned with its
corporate image. EIEI's Takahashi, in particular, was extraordinarily
good at generating a favorable corporate image. Unlike other high-
flying businessmen of the bubble era, he came from an elite back-
ground and thus was able to cut an impressive figure with Japan's busi-
ness class. Takahashi was a graduate of Keio University School of Law,
the son of a television executive, and his family tree included a former
head of a major bank and a Japanese prime minister.138 Takahashi
had little management experience and no experience in property de-
velopment. Nevertheless, he was excellent at advertising his grandiose
schemes, which included creating a massive empire of first-class tour-
ist properties across the Pacific rim.1 39 As Takahashi's firm expanded,
he received glowing reviews in the financial press. An article in the
Far Eastern Economic Review reported that "Takahashi has had luck
purchasing troubled businesses and renovating them into high profit
134 See Florence Chong, EIE Extends its Reach, Bus. REV. WKLY, June 29, 1999.
135 See Ellis, supra note 36.
136 Eric Ellis, Bond's Charitable Friend in Need, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 26, 1989,
at 33.
137 Id.
138 Buckets of Money, supra note 47.
139 See Hartcher, supra note 89.
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ventures."'1 40  Nowhere was EIEI's buzz stronger than in Australia,
where the firm was associated with mystery, intrigue, and backroom
dealings at the highest level. As one Australian commentator re-
marked of the firm during its heyday, "[1] et's just say they have some
powerful friends." Another echoed, "[t]he quality of their contacts is
second-to-none in Japan.' 4'
Enron too had an extraordinary corporate image, and it paid
much attention to maintaining its favorable appearance. It spent hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars catering to equity analysts whose opin-
ions were important to sustaining stock prices. 1 4 2 It generated a sense
of dynamism, in part by rotating staff members' positions with dizzy-
ing frequency. 14 3 The firm won Fortune's honor of "Most Innovative
Company in America" for five years running, and-in what may now
seem something of a grim joke-took first place in 2000 for "Quality
of Management" and second place for "Employee Talent." 4 4 Enron's
stellar stock performance and outstanding growth earned it adulation
in the financial community. Financial Times Energy awarded Enron the
"Boldest Successful Investment Decision" in 2000 for spending $100
million to create EnronOnline. 14 5 An article in Fortune referred to
Enron as "an "awe-inspiring juggernaut." 146 Among his peers in the
energy business, Lay appeared superhuman-a visionary mastermind
whose achievements could only inspire. 147
Likewise, WorldCom's rapid growth and high profile acquisitions
earned it a reputation as a "world-beater." 14 8 American Continental
also enjoyed favorable buzz and was known as an innovative, aggres-
sive property developer.
140 Nigel Holloway, A Pacific Playground, FAR E. ECON. REv., Dec. 1, 1988.
141 Ellis, supra note 36.
142 See Nobody Went Like Enron, supra note 104.
14" Id.
144 Enron Named to Fortune List, OIL DAILY, Dec. 20, 2000, at 7.
145 See FF Energy Presents Global Energy Awards, GAS DAILY, Dec. 4, 2000, at 3.
146 See Margaret Boitano, Is Dynegy the Next Enron?, FORTUNE, Dec. 18, 2000, at 166.
147 For examples of this awe, see The Energetic Messiah: Face Value: Enron's Energetic Inspi-
ration: By Bending All the Rules of the Energy Business, Kenneth Lay Has Turned Enron from a
Stodgy Gas Concern into a Soaring New-Economy Company, but What Has He Learned Along the
Way?, ECONOMIST, June 3, 2000, at 68.
[Wihen Kenneth Lay rose to speak [at an industry conference], there was
pin-drop silence. As the chairman of Enron sketched his vision for how
liberalisation and deregulation would transform the world's energy mar-
kets, his rivals were busily scribbling notes. Some nodded dumbly. Others
shouted out half-baked questions. Having expanded Enron's market capi-
talization ninefold over the past decade, asked one boss, could he possibly
top that? "We'll do it again this coming decade," he responded coolly.
Mouths fell agape.
Id.
148 See Valdmanis & Backover, supra note 1.
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14. Charisma
The charisma of the corporate leader also contributes to a corpo-
ration's reputation. This was certainly the case with FAI's Adler, who
was described as one of Australia's most "flambouyant" business exec-
utives. 149 In the 1980s, Adler and his father participated in some of
the most controversial Australian corporate takeover battles of the
decade. 150 Although perennially stretched financially, 15 1 Adler was
known as an "astute player with a nose for a good deal." 152 During the
Australian bull market of the mid-1980s, FAI showed truly spectacular
profits, most of which were derived from speculative positions in
stocks.1 53 HIH's Williams, equally prominent in Australian business
circles, is well-known for supporting charities and worthy causes. He
was awarded the Order of Australia in 1998 for his work as a financial
benefactor and supporter of medical research and youth welfare orga-
nizations. 154 Like Adler, he is known to have "moulded the company
in his own image." 155 Although Williams held only a small percentage
of the shares, he controlled the firm by the "sheer force of his person-
ality and his status as founder."156 Although viewed by some as con-
trolling and autocratic, Williams enjoyed passionate loyalty and
support from others.157
Enron's Lay was also charismatic and dynamic. From the early
1980s, when he became chairman of the aging Houston Natural Gas
Corp., he appeared to be a man in a hurry. 158 Within six months, he
had doubled the size of his company; within two years, he had pulled
off a merger with an even larger firm, InterNorth. This merger would
result in his heading the second-largest natural gas pipeline system
149 See The Enron Down Under, supra note 5.
150 Mychasuk & Lecky, supra note 97; seeJohn Durie, Claremont in the Balance, AUSTL.
FIN. REv., Apr. 28, 1986, at 19; Stephen Hutcheon, Gov'tJoins Advance Fray, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD, Sept. 10, 1986, at 33; Andrew McCathie & Heather Killen, Adler Ups Stake in
Hostile Hill Sam, AUSTL. FIN. REv., Feb. 4, 1987, at 38.
151 See, e.g., Michael Meagher, Csr Gets Ready to Repel the Raiders, Bus. REv. WKLY, Jan. 9,
1987, at 31.
152 Mark Westfield, Regular Shorts, SvDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 12, 1986, available at
1986 WL 5252598.
153 See, e.g., Martin Peers, FAI's Pre-tax Earnings Increase Pegged to 24pc, AUSTL. FIN. REv.,
Feb. 3, 1987, at 16.
154 See Mychasuk & Lecky, supra note 97.
155 See id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See Houston Natural Gas Corp., InterNorth Inc. To Merge, WASH. PosT, May 3, 1985, at
D2 [hereinafter Houston Natural]; Matt Moffett, Lay Doubles Houston Natural Gas's Size in
Only 6 Months as Chairman and Chief WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1984, at 24 (reporting that in only
six months as head of the company, Lay "engineered two major acquisitions that have
doubled Houston Natural's size and transformed it from a regional vendor of natural gas
into a coast-to-coast power in the interstate natural gas market").
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and the first truly nationwide natural gas system in the country. 159 He
displayed a hard-charging and competitive management style, a taste
for risk, and an eagerness to impose his personal stamp. 160 Lay's atti-
tude was optimistic and bullish: he predicted even better times for his
company. 16' He received wide credit for his pioneering approach to
the development of interstate gas pipeline networks 162 was widely
touted as a "visionary" corporate executive.1 63
The charisma of the firms' dominating figures is often enhanced
by their public involvement in charitable or community activities.
Keating's American Continental sponsored a world-class ten-kilometer
run in Phoenix, Arizona.' 64 Keating was also a prominent prolife and
antipornography activist. 165 Like other charismatic leaders, Adler is
also known for his charitable and business activities. He is a
cofounder of Australia's "National Kindness Week," a former joint
chairman of Juvenile Diabetes Australia, and the recipient of the
Member of the Order of Australia for his services to the
community. 166
EIEI's Takahashi was equally charismatic, displaying charm and
aristocratic lineage to impress the Japanese and aggressive confidence
for overseas consumption. He was known internationally as a "fast
mover,"167 mysterious but well-connected. 168
15. Easy Access to Capital
Each of the firms in our sample had ready access to capital, with-
out needing to go through the vetting process normally imposed by
banks and capital markets. EIEI provides a good example. Because of
the bubble economy, Japanese banks willingly extended loans on in-
adequate collateral without seriously credit screening anyone who ap-
peared to be a serious property developer. Takahashi, EIEI's
dominant figure, joked that getting financing from banks was like
159 Houston Natural, supra note 158; Daniel Rosenheim, Internorth To Buy Houston Natu-
ral for $2.3 Billion, CMI. TRIB., May 3, 1985, at 1, available at 1985 WIL 2511696.
160 See Moffett, supra note 158.
161 See id.
162 See Rosenheim, supra note 159.
163 See Boitano, supra note 146.
164 See Peters, sura note 101.
165 See Arizona, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 1988, at 8A (stating that properties Keating devel-
oped contained deed restrictions against performing abortions); Carson, supra note 41;
John Spano, S&L Sues To Close X-Rated Theater After City Drops Fight, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1987, at I-1.
166 See National Kindness Week Homepage, http://www.kindnessweek.com.au/foun-
ders.htm.
167 See Japanese Cove Buys Sanctuary, SUN HERALD, Oct. 2, 1988, at 50.
168 See Glenn Burge, ed., CBD, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 14, 1988, available at
1988 WL 6699538.
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"taking buckets of water from a running tap and filling a bathtub."' 69
Dr. Bungo Ishizaki, Takahashi's chief advisor, remarked that the
banks would simply take EIEI's proposals, put their own cover on
them, and provide funding with no pretense of careful credit analy-
sis. 1 70 When bank credit began to dry up, EIEI had an alternative
source of capital. In addition to controlling EIEI, Takahashi domi-
nated the Tokyo Kyowa Credit Union, a large credit cooperative in
Japan. Takahashi also exercised indirect control over another credit
union, Anzen Credit Union. Between 1992 and 1994, Takahashi ar-
ranged for loans of $18.2 billion from both Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen
Credit.17 1
Keating's American Continental, like other developers of Sunbelt
real estate during the 1970s and 1980s, found huge amounts of capital
readily available. Banks and savings and loans readily opened their
wallets to finance real estate development during this period, and they
were joined by other well-endowed lenders such as pension funds and
life insurance companies. 172 However, Keating wanted independence
from banks and other lenders, so he turned to public securities mar-
kets and raised billions of dollars through public debt offerings.1 73
Later, he turned to what seemed like an even better source of reve-
nues: a federally insured savings and loan. In addition to attracting
risk-free deposits, Keating marketed the subordinated debentures of
the parent company, American Continental, to customers of the
bank.174 The bonds were sold through the bank's teller windows. 1 75
Customers were steered to the American Continental securities when
their insured certificates of deposit matured. The securities appeared
attractive because they paid a higher interest rate than the bank de-
posit. 176 Priced to sell in the mass market, the securities attracted
14,000 buyers, most of whom lost their investments when American
Continental collapsed.
BCCI's capital source was petrodollars. Its principal investor was
Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the ruler of Abu Dhabi. 177
Sheikh Zayed, described in the Kerry-Brown Report as a simple desert
Bedouin, had placed several billion dollars of his personal wealth
169 Buckets of Money, supra note 47.
170 Hartcher, supra note 89.
171 See SCHAEDE, supra note 51.
172 See Weiss, supra note 33.
173 See id.
174 See Jonathan Lansner, Lincoln S&L Owner Sues To Have Seizure Reversed, ORANGE
CouNT-y REc., Apr. 18, 1989, at D1, available at 1989 WL 6200413.
175 See Maria L. La Ganga, Broke and Beleaguered: American Continental Bondholders Battle
To Get Their Money Back, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1989, Part IV, at 1, available at 1989 WL
2307678.
176 See id.
177 How BCCI Grew and Grew, supra note 92.
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under BCCI's management. He then essentially forgot about the in-
vestment, leaving BCCI free to divert the funds to cover operational
deficits.
16. Buoyant Economic Conditions
Each of the firms in our sample, to one degree or another, took
advantage of unusually buoyant economic conditions. Keating's Lin-
coln Savings owed much to the sunbelt boom of the 1970s and 1980s,
which was characterized by mass movement of wealth, industry, and
population to the American Southwest, especially Arizona.178- Phoe-
nix, Keating's adopted city, benefited from a huge real estate explo-
sion that lasted from the 1970s until 1987.179 What started as an
increase in prices due to economic fundamentals evolved into a full-
fledged speculative boom. 180 At its peak, development properties in
Arizona sold multiple times in a year, with prices rising steeply each
time. In one case, a tract sold four times in a year, with the sale price
increasing from $3,000 to $11,000 per acre. 181 Keating was a major
player in Arizona's boom economy. Starting with a faltering home
construction company that he purchased for $300,000 in 1976, he cre-
ated the sixth-largest homebuilder in the country. 182 As property val-
ues soared and new home construction exploded, Keating's American
Continental prospered. 1 83
HIH, the Australian insurance company, prospered as a result of
share market runup in Australia during the late 1980s. HIH's per-
formance was greatly enhanced by increases in share prices of certain
stock investments, in particular Anaconda, One.Tel and HIS.18 4
One.Tel, directed by Adler,18 5 the head of FA, displayed the same
sort of exceptionally rapid growth as HIH. Its total assets increased
200% from $48 million in June 1998 to $857 million two years later.
EIEI represents a firm whose raison d'6tre was grounded in the
enormous speculation that gripped Japan between 1987 and 1990. Ja-
pan's bubble economy presents the paradigm of buoyant economic
conditions.186
178 See Laing, supra note 26, at 34.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See Weiss, supra note 33.
182 Carson, supra note 41.
183 See Weiss, supra note 33.
184 See Witness Statement of Peter John O'Connell, supra note 79, at 18-19.
185 Doug Conway, Fed-Nothing Personal, Just Business, AAP NEWS, June 6, 2002, availa-
ble at 2002 WL 21144197.
186 See CHRISTOPHER WOOD, THE BUBBLE ECONOMY. JAPAN'S EXTRAORDINARY SPECULA-
TIVE BOOM OF THE '80S AND THE DRAMATIC BUST OF THE '90s (1992); TADASHI KATAOKA,
BANK CRISIS-ITs CAUSES AND RESULTS (Osaka City Univ., Working Paper No. 9), available at
http://www2.bus.osaka-cu.ac.jp/en/faculty/kataoka.htm.
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Enron's history is inextricably linked to the U.S. high-tech boom,
which occurred during 1997 to 1991. Enron's sophisticated approach
to business-heavy use of financial derivatives and corporate dyna-
mism-reflected the corporate ethos of the high-tech boom. Enron
eagerly entered this new market. It was a leader in the development
of a wholesale market for bandwidths, and opened an e-commerce
portal, Enron Online. 187 During the dot-coin boom, Enron's broad-
band assets contributed significantly to its market value. 188
17. Conflicts of Interest
Each of the firms in our sample was characterized by severe con-
flicts of interest on the part of senior managers. The Enron fiasco
exemplifies the most egregious conflicts of interest for senior manag-
ers. That disaster resulted largely from the extreme loss of market
confidence following disclosures that the firm had lost millions as a
result of investments in partnerships controlled by one of its top exec-
utives, Andrew S. Fastow. While the company was incurring very large
losses, the insiders were profiting handsomely. Fastow alone received
more than $30 million from Enron, his subordinate Kopper received
at least $10 million, and several other insiders received at least $1 mil-
lion. 189 The Powers Committee concluded that Enron's management
used these partnerships to "enter into transactions that it could not,
or would not, do with unrelated commercial entities." 190 In some
cases, accountants or other professionals have the conflicts of interest.
For example, Arthur Andersen not only served as Enron's external
auditor but also earned more than $5 million for advising on the
structuring of the very partnerships that Andersen was asked to bless
in the audit. 191
Conflicts of interest were also present at HIH. Justice Kim
Santow of the New South Wales Supreme Court found HIH board
member Adler to have breached his fiduciary duties to HIH by effect-
ing transfers between HIH and the companies he personally con-
trolled.192 The Lincoln Savings scandal involved massive insider
transactions in the form of loans and transfers between the thrift insti-
tution and its affiliates, which principally involved its corporate par-
187 See Boitano, supra note 146, at 168.
188 See id.
189 See PowERs REP ORT, supra note 20, at 4.
190 Id. at 3.
191 See id. at 5.
192 See Aussie Insurance Exec Banned, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, May 30, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 21841595.
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ent, American Continental.'9 3 In the case of BCCI, according to
Federal Reserve allegations, Clifford and Altman created conflicts of
interest by acquiescing in their use as fronts to disguise BCCI's secret
takeover of First American Bankshares.19 4 Clifford and Altman also
allegedly created conflicts of interest by their representation of First
American Bankshares, arranging for the acquisition of the National
Bank of Georgia by First American Bankshares at an above-market
consideration to advance BCCI's interests in maintaining ownership
of the Georgia bank.1 9
5
18. The Danger of Complex Corporate Structures
Each of the firms under review operated with a complex, or even
opaque, corporate structure. In itself, a complex structure is not
problematic. There are many reasons for a firm to operate with a
family of parents, subsidiaries, and affiliates. Firms often handle ac-
quisitions most effectively through specially chartered acquisition ve-
hicles, which remain in the corporate hierarchy thereafter. Subsidiary
corporations are desirable to preserve the limited liability of the par-
ent and thus reduce financial risk. Subsidiaries also serve such tax
purposes as minimizing sales tax, stamp duty, and capital gains tax.
Once a firm creates a separate corporate vehicle, it may be most con-
venient for the firm to leave it in place, either because of regulatory
concerns with liquidation procedures or because the subsidiary struc-
ture does no real harm.
However, the firms considered here appeared particularly prone
to using complex structures. For example, HIH, at the time of its fail-
ure, was comprised of more than 250 companies 96 and included over-
seas subsidiaries in the United States and the United Kingdom,
among other countries. 197 HIH operated five major centers: C&G,
FAI Insurances, CIC Insurance Limited, World Marine, and FAI. The
groups, however, did not appear to have a rational structure to con-
duct business. For example, HIH wrote several portfolios across three
different companies instead of consolidating them into one.19 8 The
firm managed and documented various components of business by
193 See HON. DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR. & HON. HENRY GONZALEZ, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, BANK INSIDER ACTIVITIES, INSIDER PROBLEMS AND VIOLATIONS INDICATE BROADER
MANAGEMENT DEFICIENCIES (1994), available at 1994 WrL 833308.
194 See In re Clifford, No. 92-080-E-I1, 1997 W"L 829314 (F.R.B. Jan. 14, 1997).
195 See id.
196 See HIH ROYAL COMM'N, BACKGROUND PAPER No. 1, INTRODUCTION AND CORPORATE
CHART (2001), available at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Reference/index.asp.
197 See id. at 1.
198 Witness Statement of Richard Charles Wilkinson, supra note 128, at 5.
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different methods between companies in the group and between dif-
ferent divisions of the same company. 199
Enron also illustrates the problem of needless complexity, in the
form of convoluted deals with ostensibly independent partnerships.
At the time of its collapse, Enron reportedly comprised more than
3,000 off-balance sheet subsidiaries and partnerships. 20 0
BCCI's corporate structure may be the most arcane and byzan-
tine of any of the cases studied here. At its peak, BCCI operated in
seventy-two countries through an array of subsidiaries, divisions, joint
ventures, and other corporate vehicles. Senators John Kerry and
Hank Brown, in their report on the enterprise, concluded that the
business took the form of "an elaborate corporate spider-web with
BCCI's founder, Agha Hasan Abedi and his assistant, Swaleh Naqvi, in
the middle."201 BCCI existed as two independent companies regu-
lated by two different jurisdictions: BCCI Holdings, S.A. Luxembourg,
and BCCI (Overseas), a Cayman Islands corporation. 20 2 Another in-
dependent firm, International Credit and Investment Company Over-
seas (ICIC), also a Cayman Islands corporation, purported to act as an
investment vehicle for funds owned by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. In
practice, according to the Federal Reserve, these corporate distinc-
tions concealed what was in essence a single fraudulent enterprise.
20 3
19. Corporate Governance Criteria
One might suppose, given the disasters that occurred in these
firms, that they would typify all that is wrong with corporate govern-
ance. In fact, however, most of these firms operated under govern-
ance structures that appeared to be well-designed, even state-of-the-
art.
In the case of FAI, the insurance company whose acquisition con-
tributed to HIH's collapse, the board of directors appears to have sat-
isfied all the criteria for good corporate governance. Its members
included five outside directors, one of whom served as Chairman, and
only two inside directors. 20 4 FAI maintained specialized committees
to deal with key areas of corporate business, including internal audit,
compensation, and investment committees.20 5 The board met about
199 Id. at 11.
200 See Statement of Frank Partnoy, supra note 24.
201 SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., REPORT ON THE BCCI AFFAIR
102 (Comm. Print 1992) (Sen. John Kerry & Sen. Hank Brown).
202 See In re Clifford, No. 92-080-E-I1, 1997 WL 829314, at *2 (F.R.B. Jan. 14, 1997).
203 See id. at *28-30.
204 See HIH RoYAL COMM'N, BACKGROUND PAPER No. 3, A WHO'S WHO OF THE HIH
GROUP (2001), available at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Documents/BackgroundPa-
pers/FNALBP03WhosVAho.pdf.
205 See Witness Statement of Peter John O'Connell, supra note 79, at 3.
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eleven times a year. The company operated with a Directors' Code of
Conduct and a code of conduct for senior executives. 20 6 The board of
directors received comprehensive financial documents, reports, and
regular briefings from senior managers. 207
In addition to maintaining an active and competent board of di-
rectors with a majority of outsider directors, FAI also employed more
detailed procedures. It established an audit department with seven
full-time employees.20 8 The audit process included circulation of de-
tailed questionnaires to senior managers requesting information
about adverse changes or other information relevant to the firm's bus-
iness and economic condition. 20 9 Although not required to do so,
FAI employed the reputable external actuaries Coopers & Lybrand
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 210 FAI also adopted an Investment
Code delegating authority and responsibility to named individuals as a
means of deterring dangerous or unwise investment activities. 21'
However, all these seemingly well-crafted procedures did little to pre-
vent the ultimate fiasco. Senior management at FAI failed to inform
the board of directors when they discovered the huge problem of
under-reserving and opted instead to obtain reinsurance policies that
massaged the balance sheet.2 12
The problem at FAI was not that the company failed to institute
corporate governance protections, but that these protections were not
always followed. Adler, the CEO, did not follow proscriptions against
trading in the company's stock during blackout periods; did not insist
that compliance officers be appointed as required by the Code; and
could not, in his testimony before the Royal Commission, even re-
member the Code's adoption. 213
Enron, too, implemented what appeared to be highly commenda-
ble corporate governance arrangements. It instituted a Code of Con-
duct of Business Affairs setting forth ethical obligations of senior
management towards the company. It established procedures for re-
view of related-party transactions at the highest corporate levels and
directed its Audit and Compliance Committee to conduct annual re-
views of such transactions.2 1 4 Under applicable procedures, Enron's
206 See Rodney Adler, Witness Statement Before the HIH Royal Comm'n 8286 (June
14, 2002), available at http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/Hearings/Transcript.asp [herein-
after Witness Statement of Rodney Adler].
207 See Witness Statement of Peter John O'Connell, supra note 79, at 6.
208 See Witness Statement of John Landerer, supra note 80, at 6.
209 See Witness Statement of Geoffrey Guild Hill, supra note 30, at 6.
210 See Witness Statement of Rodney Adler, supra note 206, at 8996.
211 See Witness Statement of John Landerer, supra note 80, at 6.
212 See Doug Conway, Fed-Don't Blame Me Says Adler, AAP NEws, June 8, 2002, available
at 2002 WL 21144502.
213 See Witness Statement of Rodney Adler, supra note 206, at 8296.
214 See PowERs REPORT, supra note 20, at 10.
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Compensation Committee was required to review compensation re-
ceived by Fastow from the partnerships.215
Yet these safeguards proved similarly ineffective. One provision
of Enron's Code required the consent of the Chairman and CEO
before any senior manager could assume a financial or managerial
role in a firm doing business with Enron. 216 In certain cases, however,
this requirement was simply ignored.21 7 Information about the two
partnerships that caused the greatest harm to Enron, which were con-
trolled by Fastow, was disclosed to and blessed by the board of direc-
tors and senior management in full conformity with internal
corporate procedures.218 Further, the Compensation Committee was
derelict in seeking disclosure from Fastow of his remuneration for the
related-party partnerships. 219
Capital-adequacy rules also have failed to stave off disaster. Lin-
coln Savings had positive capital when it was seized by the regulators.
In fact, Lincoln Savings had sufficient capital to satisfy, although
barely, the capital-adequacy rules then in effect for thrift institutions.
Yet within only a few months after its seizure, estimates of the cost of
Lincoln's failure ran as high as $2.5 billion.220 One may conclude, at
least based on evidence from the cases under review, that good corpo-
rate governance systems do not necessarily prevent disaster.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed and compared each of the above cases, what les-
sons can be drawn, and what reforms might be considered? The prin-
cipal causes of these disasters were underlying speculative events in
the macro-economy. If these were better controlled, there would be
fewer disasters of the type examined above. It is, however, daunting to
manage these events. Central banks, even armed with legal indepen-
dence and the best economic theories, data, and models have not
been able to suppress asset price booms. Alan Greenspan's comment
about "irrational exuberance" contributed to our lexicon of catch-
phrases, but it did not dampen the dot-coin bubble.221 The govern-
ment might do a better job at managing speculative periods without
215 See id. at 11.
216 See id. at 10.
217 See id.
218 See id. at 4.
219 See id. at 11.
220 See Senatorial Shills, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1989, at A20.
221 Alan Greenspan, The Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Re-
marks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise Insti-
tute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm.
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suppressing economic progress, but at present, the government lacks
fully effective tools to accomplish this task.
What can be done? Assigning blame is not constructive. Moral
indignation, however immediately gratifying, will not solve the prob-
lem. And greed, however unpalatable, is potentially present in every
society. The hasty conclusion is that because deregulation was present
in several of our cases, reregulation of the industries in question is the
answer. Although deregulation made some of these disasters possible,
the problem was related to defects in the design of the deregulation
rather than with deregulation per se.
Furthermore, it is important not to overreact. Psychologists ob-
serve that people tend to overestimate the severity of risks after some
disaster. That, coupled with the natural propensity of politicians to
blame everyone but themselves for problems of this nature, could
spark an excessive response. This is not to say that the government
should not take action to address the weaknesses in corporate man-
agement in recent years. However, it must bear in mind the long-term
perspective and be sensitive to the costs as well as the benefits of re-
forms. It is partly for this reason that proposals for corporate govern-
ance reform are questionable. Good corporate governance does not
prevent disasters if the culture of the boardroom is corrupt. Thus,
corporate governance reform can even be counterproductive if it oth-
erwise reduces the government's vigilance.
The multiple overlaps among the six firms examined suggests
that regulators, analysts, and providers of financing may usefully study
firms with an eye toward detecting undue accumulation of these warn-
ing signs. To the extent that they are observable, the presence of a
substantial number of the factors identified above is a cause for con-
cern. When multiple factors are present, the regulators and the finan-
cial world might appropriately take a stronger interest in the firm and
view its results with less complacency and more skepticism.
If a listed firm grows rapidly-twenty percent or more growth in
assets for each of three years-we could require the firm to flag this
fact in its financial reporting and to explain the reasons for the rapid
expansion as well as any risk factors the change might create.
One cause for optimism is that the most important reform may
already have occurred. The demise of Andersen, criminal prosecu-
tions expected for several senior executives, huge fines and civil judg-
ments, and raw fear now felt in corporate boardrooms have
fundamentally changed the rules of the game, at least in the short
term. The relationship between auditors and managers is evolving
into a true arms-length interaction, as should be the case. The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, although it did not actually require major
changes beyond what was already the practice in many corporations,
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carries with it a folklore of stringency that may have already had real
effects on the regulatory environment. Thus, a repeat of the sort of
cozy manipulations of the balance sheet that has characterized too
many of these disasters is unlikely. Ultimately, the boardroom culture
is as important as any set of formal rules in safeguarding against
abuse. With changes in corporate culture and a more sophisticated
awareness of the danger signs that often accompany firms in the midst
of fraudulent or reckless conduct, repeats of recent fiascos hopefully
may be prevented, and a renewal of investors' confidence in the hon-
esty of corporate managers and the firms they control hopefully may
be triggered.
